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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Michael R. Osborn appeals from the

petition for post-conviction relief.

his petition Without holding

Statement
In

Of The

Facts

(R.,

Osborn argues the

judgment dismissing

district court erred

his

when it dismissed

an evidentiary hearing.

And Course Of The Proceedings

August 2016, the

misdemeanor.

district court’s

p.15 1 .)

state

As

charged Michael R. Osborn With six felonies and a

part of a plea agreement,

Osborn agreed

t0 plead guilty t0

aggravated assault 0n a law enforcement ofﬁcer, unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm by a
felon,

two counts of intimidating a witness, burglary, and

petit theft.

(R., p.79.)

He

also

agreed t0 plead guilty t0 grand theft and burglary in a separate criminal case. (R., p.79.)

Osborn ﬁlled out a
Osborn

t0 “Please Circle

conﬁrmed
With

that

guilty plea advisory form. (R., pp.71-78.)

One” answer 0n each of a

series

The form

0f questions.

(R., p.72.)

He

he was “pleading guilty freely and voluntarily” and that he was “satisﬁed
(R., pp.77-78.)

[his] attorney.”

The form

also asked Whether

“any person (including

a law enforcement ofﬁcer or police ofﬁce[r]) threatened you or [did] anything to
enter this plea against your will.” (R., p.78 (emphasis in original).) “While a

over the ‘yes’ answer

At

instructed

.

.

.,

Osborn conﬁrmed, under

answers in the guilty plea advisory form and that

He

THE COURT:

mark appears

‘no’ is clearly circled.”
(R., p.390.)

the change of plea hearing,

correct.” (R., p.88.)

make you

also

Is that

THE DEFENDANT:

“all

oath, that

0f the information [was] true and

had the following exchange with the
plea agreement acceptable t0 you?

Yes, ma’am.

he circled the

district court:

THE COURT: D0

you understand you’re not required

to accept a plea

agreement?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: D0 you understand you’re not required t0

enter a guilty plea

at all?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Do you want t0
THE DEFENDANT:
(R., p.87.)

Based 0n

“underst[ood]

.

.

.

its

enter a guilty plea today?

Yes, ma’am.

conversation With Osborn, the district court found that Osborn

the consequences 0f entering guilty pleas” and “that his guilty pleas

[were] freely and voluntarily made.” (R., p.90.)

The district court accepted Osborn’s

guilty

pleas. (R., p.90.)

In September 2017,

amended

in

May

2018.

Osborn ﬁled a

petition for post—conviction relief,

(R., pp.7-10, 58-68.)

ineffective assistance With respect t0 his plea

Osborn refused

The
42.)

will

(2)

The

to accept the plea.1

state

if

threatening to Withdraw as counsel if

(R., pp.8, 64.)

two arguments:

a plea bargain

is

not accepted

p.164 (internal citation omitted).)

which he pointed out

that, in

is

pp.141-

not enough to constitute coercion” and

is

Osborn ﬁled a response

disproven by the record.”
t0 the state’s

motion

in

response to the question on the guilty plea advisory form

Osborn also asserted many other claims

(R.,

challenge the district court’s order granting
(Appellant’s brief, p.2 n.2).

(R.,

“an attorney’s impatience 0r indication that he

(1)

“Osborn’s claim that he was coerced by his attorney’s threat

(R.,

1

by

that his counsel provided

ﬁled a motion for summary dismissal 0f Osborn’s petition.

state asserted

Withdraw

Osborn claimed

which he

pp.61-68, 157), but “Mr. Osborn does not

summary dismissal 0f these claims on appeal”

about whether anyone had threatened Osborn, Osborn “made a mark over the yes answer
but he circled the n0 answer.” (R., p.219.)

The

district court

district court rejected

summarily dismissed Osborn’s

petition.

(R.,

pp.378-402.) The

Osborn’s claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by

threatening t0 Withdraw 0n the basis that Osborn’s “claim [was] disproven
(R., p.389.) Citing

record.”

Osborn’s guilty plea advisory form and the transcript of the change of

plea hearing, the district court found Osborn’s “contention that his

him

by the

to plead guilty is disproven

by [Osborn]’s

trial

counsel threatened

written and oral statements under oath t0

this Court.” (R., p.389.)

Osborn timely appealed from the judgment.

(R.,

pp.402, 406-08.)

ISSUE
Osborn

Did

states the issue

on appeal

as:

the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Osborn’s claim that

his guilty plea
threat to

was involuntary

as

it

was

the product of his

trial

counsel’s

withdraw?

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Osborn

failed to

show that the

his petition for post-conViction relief?

district court erred

when it summarily dismissed

ARGUMENT
The
A.

District Court Properly

Dismissed Osborn’s Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

Introduction

Osborn’s petition for post-conviction relief was subject to summary dismissal for

two reasons:

First, the

record disproved his allegation that he pled guilty only because his

attorney threatened t0 Withdraw. Osborn

conﬁrmed

in his guilty plea advisory

form and

the change 0f plea hearing that he did not plead guilty as the result of a threat.

even

if true,

Osborn had

Osborn’s allegation does not justify

t0

has held that

relief.

T0 prove

at

Second,

ineffective assistance,

prove that his counsel performed deﬁciently. But the Idaho Supreme Court
trial

counsel’s “threat to withdraw does not

competence demanded of attorneys

in criminal cases.”

fall

Hollon

outside of the range 0f

V. State,

132 Idaho 573,

577, 976 P.2d 927, 931 (1999).

B.

Standard

Of Review

“On review of

a dismissal of a post—conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine Whether a genuine issue 0f fact exists based

on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any afﬁdavits on ﬁle and
liberally construe the facts

Charboneau

C.

in favor

of the non-moving party.”

144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).

Summary Dismissal Was Proper Because The Record Disproved
And Osborn’s Claim Did Not Justify Relief
The

An

V. State,

and reasonable inferences

district court

Osborn’s Claim

properly dismissed Osborn’s petition for post-conviction

“applicant for post—conviction relief must prove

allegations

will

upon which the application

by

relief.

a preponderance 0f evidence the

for post-conviction relief is based.”

Charboneau,

144 Idaho

903, 174 P.3d at 873.

at

other evidence supporting

its

“The application must include afﬁdavits, records, or

allegations, or

must

state

why

such supporting evidence

is

not included.” LC. § 19-4903.

“Summary

disposition of a petition for post—conviction relief

applicant’s evidence raises

(c).

“A

court

is

n0 genuine issue of material

fact.”

I_d.;

is

ﬂ

appropriate if the

I.C. § 19-4906(b),

required t0 accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need

not accept the petitioner’s conclusions.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873.

The

district court

may dismiss

an application for post-conviction relief Without holding an

evidentiary hearing Where the allegations “are clearly disproved
original proceeding” or

supported the

relief as a matter

summary dismissal 0f Osborn’s

of law.”

the record 0f the

I_d.

Both reasons

petition.

Osborn’s claim that he only pled guilty because his

First,

to

“d0 not justify

by

trial

counsel threatened

withdraw was “clearly disproved by the record 0f the original proceeding.”

record clearly disproves a petitioner’s claim

when he

supports his claim With only his

statements and those statements contradict statements he

E

Campos

V. State,

Campos claimed
“counsel told

that his plea

that

_, 438 P.3d 787, 791

was not knowing,

incident to the guilty plea.

(Ct.

intelligent,

own

App. 2019). In

Ca_mw,

and voluntary because

his

him that his sentence would be concurrent” When such an agreement did not

actually exist. Li. at

allegations

165 Idaho 90,

made

The

I_d.

_, 438 P.3d

at 790.

The Idaho Court oprpeals held that Campos’s

“were disproved by the record” because “Campos made numerous assurances

he understood the terms of his plea agreement in the guilty plea advisory form” and

the change ofplea hearing.

I_d.

at

_, 438 P.3d at 790-91.

at

This case

is

Osborn supported

the

same

Ca_mw

as

in every

their post-conviction claims With only their

both cases, the statements

made

in support

by statements made incident to the

own

statements.

And,

in

of the post-conviction claim were contradicted

guilty plea. Here,

because his attorney threatened him.

Both Campos and

meaningful way.

(R., p.64.)

Osborn claims that he only pled guilty
But Osborn stated

in his guilty plea

advisory form that he did not enter the plea as a result 0f a threat and that he was “pleading
guilty freely

and voluntarily.”

oath, that he

marked those answers 0n

correct at the time he

(R., pp.77-78.)

He also conﬁrmed to the district court, under

the guilty plea advisory form, that the answers

marked them, and

that they

were

still

correct at the time the district

court accepted his plea. (R., p.88.) Because Osborn’s claim
record, the district court acted properly

On

appeal,

When

it

was

clearly disproved

summarily dismissed

that “the statements

Osborn concedes

were

by the

his claim.

he made through his guilty plea

advisory form and during the entry of plea hearing indicate that his plea was voluntarily
entered into.”

statements

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

made

Yet he argues

that the conﬂict

incident to his guilty plea and the statements he

between those

now makes

his petition required the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing.

in support

0f

(Appellant’s brief,

pp.8-9.)

Osborn’s argument

is

Appeals expressly rejected in

indistinguishable from the argument the Idaho Court of

Ca_mw:

Campos contends that the

district court is

required t0 conduct an evidentiary

hearing when, as here, the statements he makes in post—conviction are
contrary to the statements he
is

made incident t0 the

guilty plea.

However,

this

exactly the situation Where the appellate courts have held that the post-

conviction claims are belied by the record and subject to summary
dismissal. Without more, the district court is not, contrary to Campos’
assertion, required t0

conduct an evidentiary hearing t0 determine which 0f

Campos’ contrary statements

is

more

credible.

165 Idaho

at

,

438 P.3d

indicated, the holding in

at

791 (citations and footnote omitted).

Campos

is

hardly new.

E, 1g” Eddington V.

812, 820, 405 P.3d 597, 605 (Ct. App. 2017) (afﬁrming

claim that

trial

And,

as the court

162 Idaho

State,

summary dismissal

ofpetitioner’s

counsel “failed to properly advise [the petitioner] 0n the plea agreement

consequences” because the petitioner indicated he understood the consequences of the plea
in his guilty plea advisory

form and

at the

change of plea hearing); Grant

V. State,

156

Idaho 598, 607, 329 P.3d 380, 389 (Ct. App. 2014) (afﬁrming summary dismissal ofpost—
conviction claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by “assuring [the petitioner]
that his sentences

would run concurrently” because

the petitioner

acknowledged

in his

guilty plea forms that “the sentences could run concurrently 0r consecutively”).

Second, Osborn’s claim has a more fundamental (yet equally

fatal)

problem: his

allegations “do not justify relief as a matter of law.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174

P.3d

at 873.

that: (1)

“T0 demonstrate

counsel’s performance

the defense.”

Hollon

V. State,

was deﬁcient; and

(2) the

deﬁcient performance prejudiced

132 Idaho 573, 577, 976 P.2d 927, 931 (1999).

Idaho Supreme Court has held that

trial

counsel’s “threat to Withdraw does not

0f the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”
at 577,

976 P.2d

when he

And

fall

m,

the

outside

132 Idaho

at 931.

m,

In

must show

ineffective assistance 0f counsel, [a petitioner]

the petitioner asserted that his counsel provided ineffective assistance

“threatened to withdraw, therefore coercing his guilty plea and rendering

invalid.” Li. at 576,

976 P.2d

at 930.

The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged

record clearly indicates that [the petitioner]’s counsel told

petitioner]

went

it

that “[t]he

him he would Withdraw

if [the

to trial.” Li. Nevertheless, the court held that the petitioner’s counsel did

not perform deﬁciently because his counsel “gave

counsel” and “the

coerced”

at the

all

judge gave [the petitioner] the opportunity t0

change 0f plea hearing.

In light of

accepting

district

m,

him ample opportunity t0 ﬁnd

Osborn

0f his allegations as

Li. at

577-58, 976 P.2d

failed to allege a claim

true.

Osborn’s claim

is

expressed reservations about the plea agreement and his

at

substitute

state that

he

felt

93 1-32.

of ineffective assistance even

based on the allegations that he
“[t]rial

[c]ounsel responded

by

threatening t0 withdraw as counsel 0f record if [Osborn] did not go along with the plea

(R., p.64.)

Based 0n Osborn’s own afﬁdavit, he would have had time

attorney: he

acknowledged

agreement.”
obtain a

new

that his attorney’s Withdrawal

t0

“would’ve caused

[him] to have a public defender.” (R., p.12.) And, like in Hollon, the district court gave

Osborn the opportunity

conﬁrmed

that the plea

to state that

he

was acceptable

felt

t0

coerced.

Speciﬁcally, the district court

Osborn, that Osborn understood he was “not

required t0 accept a plea agreement,” and that Osborn understood he
enter a guilty plea at all.”

was not “required

to

Osborn’s claim was thus subject t0 summary

(R., p.87.)

dismissal for stating only allegations that “d0 not justify relief as a matter 0f law.”

Charboneau, 144 Idaho

Osborn argues

at 903,

that

an evidentiary hearing.

174 P.3d

m

does not apply because the petitioner in

(Appellant’s brief, p.9 n.5,)

wanted an evidentiary hearing, he had
warrant

P.3d
the

at

relief.

court

may

facts,

M

That misses the point.

received

If

to allege facts in his petition that, if true,

LC. §§ 19-4903, 19-4906;

873 (“When the alleged

trial

best,

E

at 873.

even

ﬂ

if true,

Osborn

would

211$ Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174

would not

entitle the applicant to relief,

dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing”). At

Osborn’s allegations give him exactly what the petitioner in Hollon had after the

evidentiary hearing: a “record [that] clearly indicates that [his] counsel told

Withdraw

if [he]

went

132 Idaho

t0 trial.”

Court held, as a matter 0f law, that

EQ

at

is

at 576,

insufﬁcient to

Charboneau, 144 Idaho

Osborn

at 903,

174 P.3d

But the Idaho Supreme

ineffective assistance of counsel.

state

notice 0f the purported basis for

rests

The

E

summary dismissal on this

basis

at 873.

waived

summary

move

this

for

theory and he did not receive adequate

dismissal.

His

(Appellant’s brief, p.9 n.5.)

on a faulty premise.

state

disposition.

basis.

have dismissed the claim on that

also argues that the state did not

Osborn’s View, the

thus, in

argument

show

at 930.

577-78, 976 P.2d at 931-32. Because Osborn’s allegations d0 not justify relief

as a matter of law, the district court could

and

976 P.2d

him he would

argued

this

(R., pp.163-64.)

was coerced by a

state agent,

theory in

The

state

its

brief in support of

its

motion for summary

pointed out that “Osborn does not allege that he

but rather his privately hired attorney.” (R., p. 164.) The state

then argued “that an attorney’s impatience 0r indication that he Will Withdraw if a plea
bargain

is

supported

not accepted

its

is

not enough to constitute coercion.”

argument with a

citation to Uresti V.

(R., p.164.)

trial

state

Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th

1987), and explained that, in Uis’ti, the Fifth Circuit held “that a plea

involuntary due t0

The

Cir.

was not rendered

counsel indicating that he would ask to Withdraw if the defendant

did not accept the plea bargain.” (R., p.164.)

The

state’s

argument and reliance on Uisti

preserved this theory for appeal and satisﬁed the notice requirement for dismissing a postconviction petition?

2

E

State V. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275,

396 P.3d 700,

Notably, in Hollon, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted extensively from Uresti t0 support

its

decision.

E

Hollon, 132 Idaho at 577, 976 P.2d at 931.

10

704 (2017) (indicating

an argument by presenting

that a party preserves

it

to the district

court below); Kelly V. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010) (“Where the

dismissal

is

based upon the grounds

offered

the

by

State,

additional

notice

is

unnecessary”).

Finally,

Osborn notes that the district court did not dismiss his petition 0n this basis.

(Appellant’s brief, p.9 n.5.) While the district court did not expressly rely 0n this theory,

this

Court can afﬁrm the

in the district court.

that

this

district court

E

Where an order of the

on any theory supported by the record and preserved

Garcia-Rodriggez, 162 Idaho
district court is correct

at

275, 396 P.3d at 704

(“It is true

but based upon an erroneous legal theory,

Court will afﬁrm upon the correct theory.” (internal quotations omitted».

Osborn’s failure to allege facts that justify relief serves as a second reason for

afﬁrm the summary dismissal 0f Osbom’s

this

Thus,

Court to

petition.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

dismissing Osborn’s petition for post-conviction

DATED this

district court’s

relief.

13th day 0f August, 2019.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

11

judgment

CERTEICATE OF SERVICE

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of August, 2019, served a true and
correct copy 0f the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
I

means of iCourt

File

and Serve:

JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
JN/dd
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